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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Adova ("Adova") and State of Rotania ("Rotania") have
submitted by Special Agreement their differences concerning certain criminal
proceedings in Adova and Rotania, and transmitted a copy thereof to the
Registrar of the International Court of Justice ("I.C.J.") pursuant to article 40(1)
of the Statute of the I.C.J. ("Statute"). Therefore, Adova and Rotania have
accepted the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Statute.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
Whether the apprehension and rendition of Samara Penza and other
Adovan citizens was a violation of Adova's sovereignty and in contravention
of International Law.
II.
Whether the subsequent detention and treatment of Samara Penza and
other Adovan citizens violated International Law.
Ill.
Whether Rotania's prosecution of the detained Adovan citizens before the
Rotanian Military Commission, including Samara Penza's prosecution for
conspiracy, arson, and murder, violates International Law.
IV.
Whether Adova's exercise of jurisdiction over Michael Kirgov and Gommel
Vinitsa to prosecute them in Adova for crimes committed against Samara Penza
and other Adovan citizens is consistent with International Law.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dissolution of Sybilla
In 1970, the Kingdom of Sybilla, following pre-set internal provincial
borders, dissolved into two independent nations: the Republic of Adova, and
the State of Rotania.
The Stovians and the Litvians are two ethnic groups with distinct
languages, religions, and cultures. The Adovan population is 75% Litvian and
10% Stovian, and the Rotanian population, 85% Stovian and 10% Litvian.
The Upland Plateau
Most Litvians in Rotania live in the Upland Plateau, considered as the
center of their culture. In Rotania, Litvians in the Upland Plateau generally
have lower per capita income, literacy rate, and life expectancy compared to
Stovians. A social and civic organization, called the Litvian Advancement and
Protection Society (LAPS), emerged among these Litvians.
The LAPS
As of 2005, the LAPS has had three factions, including a conservative
wing and the more radical Independent Litvia Solidarity Association (ILSA)
wing of LAPS, which sought the creation of an independent Litvian State, or
integration with Adova. On at least eight occasions, the Rotanian parliament
had adopted resolutions denying any political autonomy to the Upland Plateau.
LAPS has received financial assistance from the government of Adova, which
it has claimed to use exclusively for charitable and educational projects.
Samara Penza
Since 1985, the General Chairman of LAPS has been Samara Penza, a
national of Adova. Some media sources have reported that Penza has prevented
the radical elements from steering LAPS into a more violent direction. Penza
has garnered recognition from international organizations and has received
awards for weaving the LAPS factions into "a peaceful, constructive, and
positive force for change."
In January 2006, dissatisfied with the progress of their political goals, the
ILSA organized workers' strikes and protests throughout the Upland Plateau.
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Gommel Vinitsa and the 3 73rd Battalion
In February 2006, to address these uprisings, the Rotanian government
ordered the 373rd Battalion to make its presence more visible. The Battalion
was commanded by Colonel Vinitsa. ILSA spokesmen posited that the 373rd
Battalion only sought to protect the economic interests of the mines' Stovian
owners.
There were six disturbances in the Upland Plateau between February and
December 2006, which led to 100 to 300 dead, and 750 to 1,200 injured
Litvians.
Penza's public statement and ILSA 's recognition
On 1 January 2007, Penza issued a public statement, calling on Litvians
to achieve liberty, to "right historical wrongs that stand in the way of progress."
In response, the ILSA published a manifesto to "take dramatic measures" to
consummate the Litvians' "love of freedom." They vowed to avoid bloodshed
and respect basic rights.
Attacks in the Upland Plateau
On 7 January 2007 the principal Stovian Church of the Upland Plateau was
set ablaze, as well as other Stovian buildings in Rotania. ILSA leadership
acknowledged that its members carried out the operations.
Destruction of the Shrine of the Seven Tabernacles
In Zima, the Shrine of the Seven Tabernacles is overseen by a Committee
of Thirty Elders. Since January 2007, the 373rd Infantry Battalion has been
stationed nearby. During the afternoon of 22 February, the Chairman of the
Committee received a message warning that no one should be near the Shrine
that evening, starting at 2100 hours. The Chairman of the Committee sent a
message to the Ministry of Justice of Rotania, but did not get a response. At
approximately 21:30, the Shrine was completely destroyed. All seven
committee members and 15 Shrine staff died. Penza thereafter condemned the
loss of civilian lives and the use of civilians as human shields. The Adovan
ambassador condemned the attacks and reiterated Adova's resolve to combat
terrorism.
Kirgov's response
In response, President Kirgov of Rotania implemented a three-point plan.
First, he declared a national emergency under the 1980 Act, and nationalized
the military reserves. Second, he established a Military Commission to
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prosecute those responsible for the attacks. Third, he announced that Vinitsa
and the 373rd Battalion could take necessary measures to apprehend the
perpetrators, provided they were lawful. The Military Commissions allowed
for anonymous testimonies and did not permit challenges against evidence
derived from coercive interrogations. Defendants were given military lawyers,
and could not choose their own counsel. Inquiries into classified information
were likewise disallowed.
SC Resolution 2233
On 7 March, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 2233, compelling
Adova to search for Penza and the other LAPS members in its territory and
surrender them to Rotania for prosecution. Adova, in its statement in the
Security Council deliberations, refused in good conscience to surrender Penza
and the other LAPS members to the Rotanian Military Commission which
purportedly did not meet minimum standards of due process. Resolution 2233
recognized Rotania's inherent right to self-defense, but permanent member
Delta refused to acknowledge it as an endorsement to use force.
Apprehension and rendition
The Battalion apprehended Penza and 12 of their closest operatives within
Adovan territory. She was held in custody and was questioned, where she
confessed to her involvement in the attacks against Rotania. The Prime
Minister of Adova condemned Rotania's violation of Adova's sovereignty
without legal process, and demanded that Rotania disclose the location of the
detainees and return them to Adova.
Zoran Makar's statement
Camp Indigo is a Rotanian military training facility in Merkistan, a country
east of Rotania, governed by a bilateral Status of Forces Agreement. Zoran
Makar, who claimed Adovan citizenship, reported being detained in Camp
Indigo along with Penza and other LAPS members. He reported being deprived
of food and water, being subject to hanging by the wrists, and exposure to
continuous bright light, uncomfortably cold cell temperatures, and loud
discordant music.
On 13 April, shortly after sunrise, six Merkistani policemen entered Camp
Indigo and saw 20 disoriented and confused individuals in varying states of
undress. When the officers returned at 5 p.m., they saw no signs of these
persons. The next day, the Government of Merkistan demanded Rotania to
close Camp Indigo.
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Pending Military Commission trial
On 26 April, Penza and the other LAPS members were transferred to the
Military Commission. Penza was charged with conspiracy, arson, and twenty-
two counts of murder. She was scheduled to be tried on May 2008. The others
were charged with aiding a terrorist operation.
Vinitsa's and Kirgov 's retirement and arrest
Vinitsa, after being promoted to General, retired from the military and was
appointed as professor in the law of war and to a position in the Rotanian
Advisory Council on International Law. Kirgov resigned from his presidency
after undergoing heart surgery.
On 20 July, the Adovan police arrested Vinitsa in its territory for violating
Adovan statutes implementing the Torture Convention, as military commander
and legal adviser. Moreover, an international warrant was filed for the arrest
of Kirgov, as co-conspirator. The Adovan Foreign Minister announced that
both Vinitsa and Kirgov were liable for violating Adova's territorial integrity
and for grossly maltreating Adovan nationals without due process of law.
Submission before the International Court of Justice ("I. CJ ')
After suspending trade relations and dispatching troops along their shared
border, both parties submitted to the ICJ's adhocjurisdiction to adjudicate this
conflict-Adova as Applicant, and Rotania as Respondent.
[Vol. 15:1246
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Despite the emergence of equally important International Law norms in the
fight against terrorism, the fundamental rules on the consent of States in respect
of any intrusion into its territory and the protection of human rights continue to
be inviolable.
The State of Rotania ("Respondent") violated the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Adova ("Applicant") by sending military
operatives into the latter's territory in order to abduct and render Samara Penza
and other Adovan nationals ("Penza and the Others").
Respondent cannot justify this use of force by invoking its right of self-
defense because there was no armed attack attributable to Applicant and the
requirements of self-defense have not been met. Neither can Respondentjustify
its act as a countermeasure because Applicant committed no prior breach of any
of its obligations to Respondent. Respondent's conceivable argument that the
principle of aut dedere autjudicare was breached is negated by the fact that no
international crime triggering universal jurisdiction was committed in this case.
Terrorism is not a customary international crime. Even assuming terrorism
is such a crime, the absence of specific intent to spread terror here shows that
no such crime has been committed. In any event, Applicant's genuine intent to
investigate, and if warranted, prosecute Penza and the Others was precluded by
Respondent's unlawful abduction. Neither does International Humanitarian
Law justify the abduction of Penza and the Others because no armed conflict
exists in this case. Even assuming that there is, Penza and the Others are
civilians not subject to attack under the Geneva Conventions.
Further, the detention and treatment of Penza and the Others violate
International Human Rights Law. In the first place, the detention of Penza and
the Others, which exceeded more than three weeks before a case was filed
against them, was clearly arbitrary. Also, the 'extraordinary' techniques
authorized and executed by Rotanian authorities-including the deprivation of
food and clothing, and subjecting the detainees to harsh artificial environments
-- constituted torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Neither a
state of emergency nor an armed conflict can justify non-compliance with these
absolute prohibitions.
Assuming an armed conflict existed, regardless of status, Penza and the
Others were not accorded the minimum protections under International
Humanitarian Law. Respondent cannot attest that they were unlawful
combatants because no such status validly exists under the Geneva Conven-
tions.
The prosecution of Penza and the Others before the Rotanian Military
Commission violates international fair trial standards. It withholds from an
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accused right to confront witnesses face to face, allows the exclusion of
evidence obtained through torture, and the deprives him of the right to choose
counsel. Neither was the Commission independent, being constituted by the
former President as commander-in-chief and being under the control of the
military, which is part of the executive.
Respondent cannot justify its acts as a derogation of its International
Human Rights Law obligations because it failed to comply with the rules
therefor-there was no public emergency threatening the life of the nation and
the derogations were also disproportionate and unnecessary. The derogation
was also unnecessarily prolonged, even after Rotania itself declared that the
"reign of terror was over."
Moreover, the exercise ofjurisdiction over Penza and Others to prosecute
them cannot be justified under the male captus bene detentus doctrine which is
not a customary rule. Even assuming its validity, resort to the male captus
principle is permitted only in the absence of any protest by the State whose
territorial integrity has been violated.
Finally, Applicant has title to exercise jurisdiction over former President
Kirgov and retired General Vinitsa for the international crime of torture pur-
suant to three bases ofjurisdiction: universal-for committing an international
crime; protective-for committing acts against Applicant's vital interests; and
passive personality-for violating the rights of Adovan nationals. Kirgov and
Vinitsa are not entitled to immunity ratione materiae because their criminal
acts cannot be deemed official acts done in their capacity as representatives of
Respondent.
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PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES
I. THE APPREHENSION AND RENDITION OF SAMARA PENZA AND
OTHER ADOVAN CITIZENS ("COLLECTIVELY, PENZA AND THE
OTHERS") VIOLATED THE REPUBLIC OF ADOVA'S
("APPLICANT") SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Despite the emergence of equally important norms in International Law,
the fundamental rule on the consent' of States in respect of any intrusion into
its territory2 and the protection of human rights continue to be inviolable.' As
will be shown, the State of Rotania's ("Respondent") surreptitious rendition of
Penza and the Others violated Applicant's sovereignty and International Law.
A. Respondent violated Applicant's sovereignty.
As the incursion of the Rotanian Military Troops into Applicant's territory
was without the latter's consent [Compromis ("C.") 31], Respondent violated
Applicant's sovereignty guaranteed under the United Nations ("UN") Charter
and Customary International Law.
1. Respondent is guilty of intervention.
Principle 3 of the 1970 Declaration on Principles in International Law4
prohibits any State from intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever in the internal or external affairs of another State.5  The
1. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp.No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.A/8082 (1970)[hereinafter Declaration on Principles in International
Law]; BROWNL1E, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 298 (2003); SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 572
(2003); HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS ch.12 (1993); SCHACTER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE ch.12 (1993); HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS ch.4 (1994).
2. U.N. CHARTER art.2(4); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR,
20th Sess., Supp.No. 14, at 12, U.N. Doc.A/6220 (1965); Declaration on Principles in International Law,
G.A. Res. 2625(XXV); I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 334 (Jennings & Watts, eds., 1999).
3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950,
312 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226; Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror,
75 GEO. WASH. L.REv. 1201 (2007).
4. Declaration on Principles in International Law, G.A. Res. 2625(XXV).
5. G.A. Res. ES-6/2, U.N. GAOR, 6th Emerg.Sp.Sess., Supp.No. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc.A/RES/E-6/
(1980); G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp.No. 47, at 19, U.N. Doc.A/RES/38/7 (1983); Reisman,
The Resistance in Afghanistan is Engaged in a War of National Liberation, 81 A.J.I.L. 906 (1987); S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser.A) No. 10.
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extraterritorial abduction6 of an alleged criminal is therefore illegal7 as a State's
right to exercise its criminal jurisdiction is limited to its own territory,8 and
exceptionally to another State's territory with the latter's ad hoc consent or
prior consent pursuant to a treaty.9 In this case, Applicant has neither given its
ad hoc consent nor signed a treaty encapsulating such consent. Accordingly,
Respondent's apprehension and rendition of Penza and the Others violated the
duty of non-intervention.
2. Respondent's incursion into Applicant's territory amounts
to an unlawful use of force.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires States to refrain from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.0
Such Article covers any and all uses of, or threats to use, force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of States not only by means of
visible armed attacks but inconceivable attacks short of actual armed attacks.12
As exceptions to such prohibition, States may use force in self-defense when an
armed attack occurs 3 while the Security Council may authorize such use of
force. 14 However, such exceptions cannot be invoked in this case.
a. Respondent's incursion was not a valid exercise of the
right to self-defense.
i. There was no armed attack.
Article 51 of the UN Charter expressly requires the occurrence of an
armed attack as a condition for the exercise of self-defense. 5 In defining an
6. Sadat, supra note 3, at 1216.
7. Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655. 902 (1992); Regina v. Horseferry Road Magistrate's Court, ex parte Bennett, [1994] 1 A.C. 42.
8. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (2004); Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J.
(Ser.A) No.10; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §431 (1987); DAMROSCH, ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1177 (2001).
9. Articles on State Responsibility, G.A. Res. 56/83, art.20, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 162 at 3, U.N. Doc.A/RES/56/83 (2001); 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 435.
10. U.N. CHARTER art.2(4).
11. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1997).
12. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
103.
13. Id.; DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 175 (2005); BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 231-80 (1963); SIMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 661-78 (1994); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 263.
14. U.N. CHARTER arts.43-48; FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 1 (1999).
15. JESSUP, MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 164-67 (1948); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J.
[Vol. 15:1
Distinguished Brief
armed attack in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ relied on the UN General
Assembly's Definition of Aggression 16 which defines an "armed attack" as the
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces. 7
In this case, the acts purportedly committed by the Independent Litvian
Solidarity Association ("ILSA") failed to meet this standard as they merely
involved lawless violence of arson and unintentional killing of 15 individuals
in the Shrine of the Seven Tabernacles ("Shrine").
Further, Article 51 of the Charter requires Members which exercise their
right to self-defense to immediately report to the Security Council measures
taken for the latter to determine the legality of the use of force.'8 Failure to
comply with such requirement is indicative that the State itself was not
convinced that it was acting in self-defense.' 9 Accordingly, the absence of an
armed attack coupled with Respondent's failure to report (Clarifications 2) the
same negates Respondent's claim of self-defense.
ii. Assuming that there was an armed attack, it was
not imputable to Applicant.
(1) Applicant did not control the acts of ILSA or Penza and the Others.
In Nicaragua, the ICJ recognized "effective control" as the standard for
attributing to a State the acts of a non-state armed group, 0 which standard was
reaffirmed in the recent cases of Congo v. Uganda21 and Bosnia & Herzegovina
v. Serbia & Montenegro.22 According to the ICJ, effective control may be
inferred from the fact that the leaders of the group were selected by the State,
and from other factors such as the "organization, training, and equipping of the
force, planning of operations, the choosing of targets, and the operational
support provided to such group by the State., 23  Here, Applicant merely
provided financial support to LAPS-not even directly to ILSA (C.7).
Assuming that ILSA benefited from such financing, the ruling in Nicaragua is
clear that assistance "in the form of provision of weapons or logistical or other
4; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 14.
16. G.A. Res 3314(XXLX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.No. 31, art.3(g), U.N. Doc.A/9631
(1974).
17. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 194-95.
18. U.N. CHARTER art.5 1; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at In] 21-22.
19. U.N. CHARTER art.51; GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 100 (2004);
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 11121-22.
20. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 102-03.
21. 2005 I.C.J. 116, 147.
22. 2007 I.C.J. 91, 377-415.
23. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
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support '24 - while constituting use offorce-will not suffice to attribute an
armed attack to a State.
Seemingly, Prosecutor v. Tadicd provided a lower threshold-a State
must wield "overall control" over the group not only by equipping and
financing the group but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning
of its military activity. However, as Applicant neither coordinated nor planned
the attacks, Applicant may not be held liable for ILSA's acts under the standard
in Tadi6
(2) Applicant did not acknowledge and adopt ILSA's acts.
Under Article 11 of General Assembly Resolution 56/83, an initially
private conduct becomes an act of the State only if, and to the extent, that the
State acknowledges and adopts the conduct as its own.26 Article 1 1 was
meticulously crafted in order to prevent any attribution based on mere
complicity to, or endorsement of, a past act. This is evident from the Commen-
tary of the International Law Commission as Article 11 is a codification of what
various tribunals have done in the past, particularly in the Lighthouses
Arbitration27 and Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran28 where it was held
that that the seal of governmental approval to the acts involved andthe decision
to perpetuate them translated the continuing breach of the private group into the
acts of Greece and Iran. In this case, no such seal and decision were given by
Applicant which, in fact, expressly undertook to prosecute the offenders, if
necessary (C.42).
b. Respondent cannot hide under the cloak of Security Council Resolution
No. 2233 ("Resolution 2233").
i. The language of Resolution 2233 betrays Respondent's claim.
The Security Council through Chapter VII of the UN Charter has the sole
authority to determine when a threat to, or breach of, the peace has occurred2 9
and the authority to order the use of force against a State.3" The clear language
of the resolution is in itself determinative as to whether any such authorization
is given.3 In this case, the language of Resolution 2233 lacks a clear
24. Id.
25. Prosecutor v. Tadi5, Case No.IT-94-1 -A, 131 (1999).
26. CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 121 (2002).
27. 12 R.I.A.A. 155, 198 (1956).
28. 1980 I.C.J. 3.
29. U.N. CHARTER art.39.
30. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 215 (1994).
31. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South African Namibia (South
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authorization for Respondent, or any State for that matter, to resort to the use
of force. 2
ii. Even assuming that Resolution 2233 sanctions the use of force against
Applicant, any use of force under such resolution is unlawful.
The Security Council is required to clearly specify the extent, nature, and
objective of the military action as any broad and indeterminate language
provides States the opportunity to use force limitlessly.33 Absent such clear
specification,34 the use of force by any State pursuant thereto would be
invalid.35  Here, other than a statement in Resolution 2233 that affirms
Respondent's right to self-defense,36 the Security Council did not determine the
extent of the exercise of such right. Accordingly, Respondent's use of force
pursuant to Resolution 2233 was invalid.
3. Neither could Respondent justify its acts as a countermeasure.
An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is
responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce the latter to
comply with its international obligations.37 As will be shown in Part I(B),
Applicant did not commit a prior breach of its international obligations.
More importantly, a legitimate countermeasure may not involve the use of
force unless the same is exercised by virtue of the right to self-defense.38 As
Respondent was not faced with any armed attack, the abduction of Penza and
the Others by Respondent's Military Troops constituted an unlawful
countermeasure. 3
West Africa) Notwithstanding S.C. Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16.
32. Byers, Terrorism, the Use ofForce andlnternational Law after 11 September, 51 I.C.L.Q. 401
14 (2002).
33. DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 269 (2004);
SAROOSHI, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DELEGATION OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS 156 (1999).
34. See e.g. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc.S/RES/731 (1992); S.C. Res. 748,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc.S/RES/748 (1992); S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N.
Doc.S/RES/883 (1993).
35. SIMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 751 (2002).
36. S.C. Res. 2233, 6000th mtg., U.N. Doc.S/RES/2233 (2007)[Compromis Appendix ("C.A.")
1]
37. Naulilaa, 2 R.I.A.A 1011, 1025-026 (1930); Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S.
v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 416 (1979); CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 168.
38. DINSTEiN, supra note 13, at 222.
39. Id. at 45; Cysne, 2 R.I.A.A. 1035, 1052 (1930).
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B. Applicant did not harbor any international criminal.
1. The principle of aut dedere autjudicare does not apply as no crime
triggering universal jurisdiction was committed.
The customary principle of aut dedere autjudicare"4 requires States to
prosecute or surrender individuals suspected of having committed crimes
triggering universal jurisdiction. As will be explained, no such crimes were
committed in this case.
a. No terrorist act was committed
The inconsistency of State Practice illustrates that no single definition of
terrorism exists.4' Absent a clear definition ofterrorism, 42 ILSA members could
not have committed such crime.
Assuming however that a crime of terrorism exists, no terrorist act was
committed. In Prosecutor v. Gali 4 the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") identified the 'specific intent' to spread 'terror' as the
mens rea of terrorism. The absence of casualties in the first incidents reveals
that ILSA endeavored to commit the acts where few people could be harmed
(C. 18). In fact, the attack against the Shrine was even preceded with a warning
to the Committee of Elders (C. 19). These events serve to indicate the absence
of any specific intent to spread terror.
b. No crime against humanity was committed.
The customary definition of crimes against humanity" does not include
destruction of property. While such definition includes murder, "intent to kill"
is required to elevate killings into crimes against humanity. 5 Here, the death
of civilians was not intended as the main intent behind the attack was merely
to burn the sites (C. 18) and any death was merely collateral damage.
40. BAssIouN &WISE, AUTDEDEREAUTJUDIcARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 3 (1995); BANTEKAS & NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 91 (2007).
41. Qadir, The Concept of International Terrorism: An Interim Study of South Asia, in ROUND
TABLE 333-39 (2001); Franck, Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism,
68 A.J.I.L. 69 (1974).
42. Koufa, Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, In Particular Terrorism, Additional
Progress Report, 4, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WP.18 (2003).
43. Case No.rr-98-29-A, 1104 (2006).
44. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, art.8(2Xa), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
45. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No.IT-96-21-T, "439 (1998).
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c. ILSA 's acts do not constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are considered war crimes.46
These include willful killing of civilians,47 wanton destruction of civilian
property,4' and other violations of the laws and conduct of war.49 In this case,
no such killing was willful as ILSA itself declared that it will try to "avoid
bloodshed" (C. 17) and not destruction of property was wanton but was, on the
contrary, merely politically inspired (C. 18).
2. Assuming that such crimes were committed, Penza and the
Others did not participate therein.
a. No superior-subordinate relationship exists between Penza and ILSA.
A superior-subordinate relationship requires the superior to exercise a
responsible position, (whether political or military, entitling him to give orders
to, or punish, his subordinates."0 To establish responsibility, however, they
must enjoy direct and effective command and control over their subordinates,"
and the material ability to order an attack. 2
Here, Penza is the General Chairman of the LAPS, not ILSA. Although
she has a certain level of influence over all the factions of the LAPS, this
influence fails to establish her 'material ability' to specifically order the taking
of military-like actions against Respondent. Notably, ILSA has a distinct
leadership (C. 17, 19) and their invocation of Penza as their "fearless leader"
(C. 17) is a symbolic affectation fora widely-recognized leader (C.9, 10) of the
Litvian cause. Consequently, no superior-subordinate relationship exists
between Penza and ILSA.
b. Penza and the Others are not guilty of instigation.
A person is guilty of instigation if he orders, solicits or induces the
commission of a crime. 3 As no superior-subordinate relationship herein exists,
any orders to commit a crime by Penza cannot be implied. 4 The act of
soliciting or inducing imply commanding, authorizing, urging or affecting,
46. Rome Statute, art.8(2)(a).
47. Id. art.8(2)(e)(i).
48. Id. art.8(2)(e)(iv).
49. Id. art.8(2)(e).
50. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No.ICTR-99-44-T, 774 (2003); Bantekas, The Contemporary
Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 A.J.L. 574 (1999).
51. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No.IT-01-42-T, 360 (2005).
52. Prosecutor v. Naletilid & Martinovid, Case No.IT-98-34-T, 76 (2003); WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 130 (2005).
53. Rome Statute, art.25(3)(b).
54. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No.ICTR-96-4-T, 483 (1998).
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causing or influencing a course of conduct by persuasion or reasoning." Here,
the declarations of Penza were merely expressions of political support for
Litvian independence (C. 16, 23) and not a confession of guilt,5 6 while no fact
in the Compromis shows any soliciting or inducing by the Others.
3. Assuming further that Penza and the Others participated in such crimes,
Respondent did not violate the principle of aut dedere autjudicare.
a. Applicant validly refused to surrender Penza and the
Others to Respondent.
i. The rights of Penza and the Others to fair trial would be,
and was indeed violated.
It is illegal57 to surrender a person to another State where there is a real
risk that his human rights, including his right to fair trial,58 would be violated.
Here, former President Kirgov declared that all persons charged with the attacks
will be tried under the Military Commission (C.25) which, as will be shown in
Part I1, deprives an accused the "minimum standards" of due process (C.26).
ii. There was risk of torture.
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"),59 imposes upon States the
obligation not to "expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture. '6' Here, the validity of Applicant's refusal
to surrender Penza and the Others was based on retired General Vinitsa's
Proclamation authorizing the use of extraordinary techniques, which will be
proved in Part II(B)(1) as constituting torture, in the interrogation of the persons
charged with terrorist offenses (C.A.III 3).
55. Eser, Individual CriminalResponsibiliy, in ! CASSESE, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMiNAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 796 (2002).
56. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.& Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 378.
57. Dugard, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 A.J.I.L. 187 (1998).
58. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(l), art.10, U.N. Doc.A/810, at 71
(1948)[hereinafter UDHR]; ICCPR, art. 14.
59. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
60. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., art.3, U.N. Doc.A/RES/39/46 (1984); see also U.N.
Model Treaty on Extradition, art.3(f), G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. Doc.A/RES/45/116 (1990).
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b. Applicant is willing to prosecute Penza and the Others.
While any State may exercise enforcement jurisdiction over crimes
triggering universal jurisdiction,6' the State where the offender is found retains
the primary jurisdiction to do so. 62 The custodial State must be given a chance
to show its serious intention to prosecute the offenders in accordance with the
presumption of good faith.63 In this case, Respondent's precipitate haste
precluded Applicant from exercising such jurisdiction. In fact, less than a
month from the adoption of Resolution 2233, Penza was already abducted by
the Rotanian Military despite Applicant's Prime Minister's declaration that
Applicant will conduct its own investigation and legal proceeding (C.A.H).
C. Respondent cannot justify its act under the Laws of War.
1. No armed conflict exists.
In Tadi, the ICTY held that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups, or between such groups
within a State, but not where the conflict involves mere isolated and sporadic
attacks of violence.' In this case, the attacks were committed with significant
intervals in between-as much as 13 days-proving the sporadic nature of the
attacks (C. 18). Further, a geographical mapping of the attacks reveals no
consistency in the targets, involving public places in Rotan and the Upland
Plateau.
Applicant is aware that the Inter-American Commission in Abella v.
Argentina65 has seemingly lowered the threshold to "carefully planned,
coordinated and executed armed attack against a quintessential military
objective." However, even under this standard, it cannot be said that an armed
conflict existed as the religious and cultural sites were not quintessential
military objectives because they would not offer any military advantage to
Respondent.
61. DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2005);
Scharf, Application of Treaty-based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG.
L.REv. 363 (2001).
62. Kolb, The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over International Terrorists, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 250 (Bianchi ed., 2004).
63. Id. at 262; Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser.A) No.7, at 30.
64. Tadie, Case No.IT-94-I-A, at 70.
65. Case 11.137, Report No. 5/97, Inter-Am.C.H.R., OEA/Ser.LJV/II.98(1998).
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2. Assuming that an armed conflict exists, the capture of Penza and the
Others is unlawful.
If Respondent insists that it is engaged in an armed conflict with ILSA,
then Applicant is quick to add that this armed conflict is an internationalized
non-international armed conflict pursuant to Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions ("AP I") which includes wars of national libera-
tion.66 Such wars are usually linked with the principle of self-determination
which is the right of all peoples to freely determine "without external
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social, and
cultural development."67 Here, the armed conflict is with the Litvians who have
a distinct identity and inhabit a specific region (C.2) and were subjected to a
pattern of systematic political or economic discrimination (C.4) by Respondent,
who rejected their reasonable proposal for autonomy (C.8).68
a. Penza and the Others are protected persons.
As civilians are not members of the armed forces,6 9 they cannot be the
object of a military attack unless they take direct part in hostilities.70 Pursuant
to the Geneva Conventions and AP I, Penza and the Others - being civilians
- are not legitimate military targets and are therefore immune from attack and
capture.
b. Assuming that Penza and the Others are not civilians, such enforcement
measures cannot go beyond the enforcing State's territory.
Military operations of the parties to a conflict shall only be carried out in
the area of war.71 Hence, military operations shall not be carried out in the
territories of other States not parties to the conflict.72 The presence of Penza
and the Others in Applicant's territory did not extend the area of war as no
hostilities occurred in the place where they were captured. Accordingly,
Respondent's incursion into Applicant's territory violated the laws and customs
of war.
66. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, art.1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].
67. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514(XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp.No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.A/4684(1961).
68. Schacter, Sovereignty-Then andNow, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WANG TIEYA 684 (Mcdonald
ed., 1993); KNOP, DIVERSrrY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (2002).
69. AP I, art.50(1).
70. Id.
71. 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 236-44 (1952); FLECK, supra note 14, at 51.
72. FLECK, supra note 14, at 218, 494.
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II. THE SUBSEQUENT DETENTION AND TREATMENT OF PENZA
AND THE OTHERS VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW.
As the commission of the most horrific crime73 cannot justify the deprivation74
of the rights of the offender, whether under International Human Rights Law
or International Humanitarian Law, the detention and treatment of Penza and
the other Adovan citizens violated International Law.
A. The detention of Penza and the Others was arbitrary.
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),
no one shall be subjected to arbitrary deprivation of liberty.75 Any person
detained must be brought promptly before a judge or other judicial officer for
the prosecution of alleged offenses.76 The term "promptly" means within a few
days.77 Here, the detention of Penza and the Others lasted for more than three
weeks (C.31, 33, 37) without any charges filed against them in the courts of
law. Accordingly, their continued detention violated their right against
arbitrary deprivation of liberty under the ICCPR.7s
B. Respondent's interrogation techniques consitute torture and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading Treatment or punishment.
Acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
are prohibited.79 Due to its non-derogable nature, the prohibition against torture
has been elevated to ajus cogens0 norm and erga omnes8 l obligation. Hence,
neither a state of war nor any public emergency, 2 and not even the commission
of terrorism, 3 may be used as a justification for torture.
73. Tomasi v. France, App.No. 12850/87, 15 E.H.R.R. 1 (1992).
74. Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, 1997 Inter-Am.Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 33, at 57 (1997).
75. ICCPR, art.9(l).
76. Id. art. 9(3).
77. H.R. Comm., General Comment 8, 2, U.N. Doc.HRIIGEN/1/Rev.1 at 8 (1994).
78. ICCPR, art.9.
79. CAT; UDHR, pmbl. 1; ICCPR, pmbl.1l; Declaration on the Protection ofAll Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
3452 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc.A/10034 (1975); Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 1949, arts.3, 17, 87, 130, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC m1]; Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, arts.3, 32, 147, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
80. First Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1986/15, 3 (1986);
Prosecutor v. Furundhija, Case No.lT-95-17/1-T (1999).
81. BRODY & RATNER, THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND
BRrAIN 238 (2000); See also Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. 3.
82. CAT, art.2; ICCPR, arts.4, 7.
83. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App.No. 22414/93,23 E.H.R.R. 413, 79 (1996).
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1. Respondent violated CAT.
a. Respondent committed torture.
Under Article 1 of the CAT, torture is defined as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him information or a confession, punishing him for an act he is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."
As will be explained, Respondent's treatment of Penza and Others falls
within the above definition.
i. Respondent authorized the infliction of physical
and mental pain and suffering.
Respondent, through former President Kirgov, empowered the 373rd
Infantry Battalion and its commander, then Colonel Vinitsa, to take the
measures they deemed necessary to apprehend Penza and her "band of
terrorists" (C.25). Colonel Vinitsa, in turn, issued a Proclamation (C.A.III.4)
authorizing the Enforcers to engage in the following practices with respect to
persons suspected of having participated in terrorist acts: deprivation of sleep,
clothing, and food; subjection to extremes of heat and cold; forced adoption of
stress positions; and interrogation techniques (C.A.III).
ii. The interrogation techniques employed were calculated to achieve certain
purposes prohibited under the CAT.
Rotanian authorities inflicted pain and suffering to extract a confession
from Penza and the Others. The extraordinary techniques (C.AIn.5) were
deliberately employed in the interrogation of Penza and the Others detained on
suspicion that they participated in terrorist acts (C.AII.4). In fact, both retired
General Vinitsa and former President Kirgov, in statements respectively given
at a press conference (C.3 1) and at a special session of Parliament (C.38), have
categorically admitted that they questioned Penza and as a result, were able to
extract confessions regarding her involvement in the alleged terrorist activities.
Adamant to convict the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, Respondent hastily
84. CAT, art. 1.
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accused Penza and the Others with barely any proof linking them to the acts of
terrorism.
iii. The infliction of severe mental and physical pain on Penza and the
Others was intentional.
Torture is conditioned upon the intent to cause pain and suffering. In this
case, the authorities subjected Penza and the other LAPS members to suffering
pursuant to the authority granted by Colonel Vinitsa (C.AIII.4). Such prior
authorization coupled with their actual execution militates against Respondent's
denial of intent to cause suffering.
iv. The suffering of Penza and the Others was not
pursuant to a lawful sanction.
An exception from the definition of torture is "pain or suffering arising
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."86 This exception however
does not only require that a law is promulgated to authorize the pain or
suffering, 87 but such law and its enforcement must not be arbitrary.8 In this
connection, State Practice demonstrates that the following interrogation
techniques, which Respondent likewise used, are arbitrary and illegal:
deprivation of sleep, food, and clothing; intermittent hanging from the wrists,
stress positions, exposure to cold temperature, continuous bright light; and loud
discordant music.89 Thus, by no means can Respondentjustify its acts as lawful
under International Law.
b. Respondent's acts were cruel, inhuman or degrading.
The classification of treatment as cruel, inhuman or degrading is often a
matter of severity, intensity, and the totality of the circumstances.9" To
illustrate, detention for at least two weeks coupled with substandard conditions
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Dinstein, Right toLife, PhysicalIntegrity andLiberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS
130 (Henkin ed., 1981).
88. JOSEPH, ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES,
MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 308 (2004).
89. Rodley, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1996/Add. I (1996).
90. Upholding the Rule of Law: A Special Issue of The Record, 59 N.Y. RECORD OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR 200 (2004).
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amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.9 In this case, Penza and the
Others were detained for three weeks and were exposed to interrogation
techniques that have been held in various cases to constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment: inadequate food and water,92 intermittent hanging by the
wrists from chains,93 exposure to continuous bright light, sleep deprivation, 4
uncomfortably cold cell temperatures and loud discordant music95 (C.33). The
vast jurisprudence holding the same techniques used herein to be cruel,
inhuman and degrading clearly indicate Respondent's violation of the CAT.
Another form of prohibited treatment under this article is enforced
disappearance, an aggravated form of detention where one is not necessarily in
solitary confinement, but is denied access to family, friends, and counsel.96 In
all circumstances, a relative of the detainee should be informed of the arrest and
place of detention within 18 hours97 and enforced disappearance of at least five
days has been considered cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by
Article 16 of the CAT.9" In detaining Penza and the Others at a secret location
(C.3 1) without their families being notified of their place of detention or state
of health, Respondent violated the CAT.
2. Respondent violated the ICCPR.
Article 7 of the ICCPR states, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. " Interpreting this
provision, the Human Rights Committee did not find it necessary to establish
sharp distinctions between the different types oftreatment or to enumerate a list
of prohibited acts.'"0 In most cases, the Committee has simply determined
91. See Inquiry under Article 20: Committee Against Torture, Findings Concerning Peru, 35, U.N.
Doc.A/56/44 (2001).
92. H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations concerning Germany, T167, U.N. Doc.A/48/44 (1993);
H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations concerning New Zealand, 175, U.N. Doc.A/53/44 (1998).
93. H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Israel, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (1998).
94. ld; Concluding Observations concerning Republic of Korea, 56, U.N. Doc.A/52/44 (1996);
Upholding the Rule of Law, supra note 90, at 188.
95. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 25, 167 (1978).
96. JOSEPH, supra note 88, at 253. See also Laureano v. Peru, Comm.540/1993, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993 (1996); Shawv. Jamaica, Comm.704/1996, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/62/D/704/1996
(1998).
97. H.R. Comm., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, 26(g), U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/2003/68
(2002).
98. Concluding Observations on Spain, U.N. Doc.A/58/44, §61 (1997).
99. ICCPR, art. 7.
100. H.R. Comm., General Comment 20: Article 7, 4, U.N. Doc.HRJ/GEN/I/Rev.I at 30 (1994).
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whether or not a State committed a breach ofArticle 7.1o" As with the CA T, the
use ofsuch techniques as deprivation ofsleep, 2 inadequate food and water,' 3
and hanging by the wrists from chains have been determined to constitute
prohibited treatment under Article 7. Hence, Respondent's use of these
techniques also violates the ICCPR.
In addition to the prohibition under Article 7, Article 10 of the ICCPR
requires that all persons deprived of their liberty be treated with humanity and
respectfor the inherent dignity ofthe human person.0 4 This provision has been
elevated to a jus cogens norm not subject to any derogation. "o Moreover,
Gilboa v. Uruguay1°6pronounced that enforced disappearance for fifteen days
already constituted a breach of Article 10(1) of the ICCPR. In this case,
Respondent's detention of Penza and the other Adovan citizens in a secret
location for more than three weeks clearly violates the ICCPR.
C. On the assumption that an armed conflict exists, Respondent's detention
and treatment of Penza and the Others is unlawful.
Under the regime of International Humanitarian Law, torture, or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment during any armed conflict is
likewise prohibited0 7 regardless of any State of alleged necessity.
1. Whether they are classified as civilians, combatants or unprivileged
combatants, Penza and the Others were not accorded the minimum
standards guaranteed to detained persons in criminal proceedings.
UnderAPL the physical or mental health and integrity ofpersons who are
in the power of the adverse Party or who are interned, detained or otherwise
deprived of liberty as a result of an internationalized non-international armed
conflict shall not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission.0 8 Any
101. 4 JOSEPH, SEEKING REMEDIES FOR TORTURE VICTIMs: A HANDBOOK ON THE INDIVIDUAL
COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES OF THE UN TREATY BODIES 158 (2006).
102. Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm.52/1979, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (1981); Ireland
v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. at 167; Aksoy v. Turkey, App.No.21987/93, 23 E.H.R.R. 553 (1996).
103. NOwAK, U.N. CoVENANTON CIViLANDPOLTICALRIGHTS: CCPRCOMMENTARY 129(1993).
See also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. at 167; Brown v. Jamaica, Comm.775/1997, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997 (1999); Muteba v. Zaire, Comm.124/1982, Supp.No. 40, U.N. Doc.A/39/40
(1984); Miango Muiyo v. Zaire, Comm.194/1985, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990).
104. ICCPR, art.10(1).
105. H.R. Comm., General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), 11, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).
106. Comm.147/1983, 14, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990).
107. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 218.
108. API,art.11(1).
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willful act or omission that seriously endangers the physical or mental health
or integrity of any person is a breach of AP L 9
Minimum standards regarding the conditions of detention must be
complied with, regardless of a State party's level of development,"0 such as
adequate sanitary facilities, decent clothing, adequate provision offood, and
hygiene facilities."' The basic food rations need to be sufficient in quantity as
to keep detainees in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the
development of nutritional deficiencies."' That such standards were not
observed by Respondent is apparent from Makar's testimony itself (C. 33) and
his medical examination which revealed that he was malnourished and sleep-
deprived, with bruising around his wrists (C. 33).
2. The declaration of retired General Vinitsa that Penza and the Others are
enemy combatants has no basis in International Law.
The term "enemy combatant" is not recognized in International Law. 11
3
The sole practice of the U.S. is not supported by a majority of States and has
been criticized by many."4 As due process guarantees should be respected
regardless of the categorization of individuals in domestic law, "' a detaining
power is not permitted to deny the basic humanitarian protections to those
considered as "enemy combatants ". "' Accordingly, Respondent cannotjustify
its acts in accordance with the pursuit of enemy combatants.
109. Id. art.11(4).
110. Mukong v. Cameroon, Comm.458/1991, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994).
111. Id. at 9.3; H.R. Comm., General Comment 21: Article 10, 5, U.N. Doc.HRI/GEN/I/Rev. I
at 33 (1994); Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, First UN Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment ofOffenders, prelim. observations, rules 10, 12,17,19,20,21, E.S.C. Res. 2076,
U.N. ESCOR, 62d Sess., Supp.No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc.E/5988 (1977)[hereinafter SMRTP].
112. GC DI, art.26(1).
113. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 112 (2003)[hereinafter IBA ON
TERRORISM].
114. DuFFY,supra note 61, at397, 401.
115. IBAON TERRORISM, supra note 113, atll3.
116. Id.
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II. RESPONDENT'S PROSECUTION OF THE DETAINED ADOVAN CITIZENS
BEFORE THE ROTANIAN MILITARY COMMiSSION, INCLUDING PENZA 'S
PROSECUTION FOR CONSPIRACY, ARSON, AND MURDER, VIOLATES
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A. The prosecution by the Rotanian Military Commission violates
international Human Rights standards for due process.
Article 14 of the ICCPR guarantees fair trial before an independent and
impartial tribunal. Pursuant to this Article, the trial of civilians before military
commissions is almost unanimously considered a violation of said Article
because military commissions are not independent"7 and employ exceptional
proceedings that violate fair trial procedures. "'
1. The Rotanian Military Commission violates the rule on independent and
impartial tribunal.
The right to an independent and impartial tribunal is an absolute right not
subject to any exception."' Based on extensive State practice20 and Opinio
Juris,'2' the trial of civilians before military commissions has been regarded
with disfavor as it does not meet the standard of independence and
impartiality, 122 owing largely to lack of autonomy of the military from the
executive department.'23
Here, the independence of the Rotanian Military Commission is seriously
undermined as it was constituted by the former President himself (C.25), who
is also the commander-in-chief of the military(C.29). Hence, the Rotanian
Military Commission must inhibit itselffromprosecutingPenza and the Others
because it is not an independent and impartial tribunal.
117. Polay Campos, Comm.577/1994, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 (1998).
118. H.R. Comm., General Comment No.13: Equality Before the Law (Article 14), U.N.
Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003).
119. Gonzales del Rio v. Peru, Comm.263/1987, U.N. Doc.CCPRIC/46/263/1987 (1992); H.R.
Comm, supra note 105, at 16.
120. Oviedov. Paraguay, Case 12.013, ReportNo.88/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 106 doc.3 rev. 30 (1999);
lnter-Am.C.H.R., First Report on the Situation ofHuman Rights in Chile, OAS Doc.OEA/Ser.LJV/H.34 doc.
21 (1974); Inter-Am.C.H.R., Reports on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Colombia, OAS
Doc.OEA/Ser/LJV/ll.53 doc.22 (1981); Findlay v. United Kingdom, App.No. 2107/93, 24 E.H.R.R. 221,
74-77 (1997); Cyprus v. Turkey, App.No. 25781/94, 2001-IV Eur.Ct.H.R. (2001).
121. H.R. Comm., Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 180, U.N.
Doc.E.CN/4/1999/63 (1998); Joinet, Issue on the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals and
other Exceptional Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/4 (2002).
122. Incal v. Turkey, App.No. 22678/93, 449 E.H.R.R. 316, 323 (2000); Goldman & Orentlicher,
When Justice Goes to War, Prosecuting Persons before Military Commissions, 25 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
653, 659-660 (2002).
123. DUFFY, supra note 61, at 423.
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2. The Rotanian Military Commission violates the right to a fair trial.
a. The rules of the Military Commission violate the right regarding
confrontation of witness and production of evidence.
Pursuant to Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR, an accused is entitled to the
examination of witnesses and production of evidence. Both rights guarantee
fair trial by giving the accused an "equality of arms. ,124 In Peart v.
Jamaica,125 the Human Rights Committee held that the right to examine and
obtain the attendance of a witness was violated when the prosecution refused
to give the accused a copy of a witness' statement. In the present case, the
Rotanian Military Commission totally allows witnesses to testify under
conditions of anonymity and denies the accused the right to inquire into the
sources of evidence (C.26).
b. The rules of the Military Commission violate the rules against the
admissibility of evidence derived from coercive interrogation.
Evidence obtained through torture and other inhuman treatment should
not be admitted into evidence in any proceeding.126 Pursuant to Article
14(3)(g) of the ICCPR, evidence derivedfrom compulsory interrogation of the
accused violates his right against self-incrimination.127  Accordingly,
statements made out of torture and other cruel or inhumane treatment'28 must
be excludedfrom the evidence. 129 By allowing evidence derivedfrom coercive
interrogation, (C.26) the Rotanian Military Commission violated the ICCPR.
c. The Rotanian Military Commission violates the right to
counsel of one's own choice.
A person accused of a criminal charge is entitled to defend himself
through legal counsel of his own choosing, 13' and to communicate to such
chosen counsel.'3' An accused should not be forced to accept an assigned legal
124. Parkanyi v. Hungary, Comm.410/90, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/45/D/410/1990 (1992).
125. Peart v. Jamaica, Comm. Nos.464/1991 & 482/1991, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/54/D/464/1991 &
482/1991 (1995).
126. CAT, art.15.
127. ICCPR, arts. 14 (3)(g), 7, 10; JOSEPH, supra note 88, at 449.
128. JOSEPH, supra note 88, at 450.
129. H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations on Romania, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.1 11 (1999);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
130. ICCPR, art.14(3)(d); ECHR, art.6 (3); American Convention on Human Rights, 1969,
art.21(4)(d), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art.7(3), U.N. Doc.S/RES/827 (1993)[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
131. ICCPR, art.13 (3)(b).
[Vol. 15:1
Distinguished Brief
counsel, '32 but must be given the right to choose his own. 33 Rotanian Military
Commission Rules violates this guaranteed right because it assigns a military
counsel (C. 26) and does not afford the accused a counsel of his own choice.
3. The declaration of national emergency under the Protection of the State
Act is not a valid derogation under the ICCPR.
States are allowed to derogate from obligations enunciated under the
ICCPR on the basis that they face a "public emergency threatening the life of
the nation. ,,13 However, such derogation must satisfy certain conditions. 3
As will be shown, Respondent failed to comply with these conditions.
a. There is no public emergency threatening the life of the nation.
Not every disturbance justifies derogation, but only those public
emergencies threatening the life of a nation. 36 Such standard is intentionally
high in order to prevent States from invoking states of emergency as an alibi
to justify impermissible restrictions on human rights.137 Here, the measures
implemented by Respondent are not warranted by the exigencies of the actual
situation. As previously established in Part I(B)(1)(a), the attacks against
Respondent are not terrorist acts which produced a state of terror. Neither
were the attacks protracted or sustained as to imperil the life of Respondent as
a nation as shown in Part I(C)(1).
Assuming any such threat to the life of the nation existed, the same has
ceased to exist as retired General Vinitsa himself stated in an official press
conference that "the reign of terror is over" (C.31). This statement is
corroborated by former President Kirgov who claimed that all of the suspects
were already in custody and were already neutralized (C. 38). Hence, by such
admission, there is no longer any exigency that wouldjustify any derogation of
the ICCPR.
b. The derogation measures are not proportionate and necessary.
Based on the principle ofproportionality, it isfundamentalfor any ICCPR
derogation to be limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
132. Kelly v. Jamaica, Comm.235/87, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 (1991); Lopez Burgos v.
Uruguay, Comm.52/1979, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/13/D/1979 (1981).
133. Estrella v. Uruguay, Comm.74/80, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990).
134. ICCPR, art. 4; DUFFY, supra note 61, at 393.
135. DUFFY, supra note 61, at 393.
136. ICCPR, art.4; ECHR, art. 15; ACHR, art.27(1).
137. H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations on Syrian Arab Republic, 6, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/CO/71/SYR (2001); H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations on Egypt, 6, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/CO/76/EGY (2002).
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situation. 38 Hence, the measure for derogation must neither be more severe
nor more prolonged than necessary. 39  When applied to this case, any
derogation measure would have been proportionate and necessary if security
risks are increased due to Respondent's grant of the rights normally granted
to an accused in a regular trial, i.e. right to a chosen counsel.40 As no such
increase of security risks is present, Respondent's acts are not proportionate
and necessary.
B. The exercise ofjurisdiction by the Rotanian Military Commission over
Penza and other Adovan nationals subsequent to their unlawful arrest and
rendition cannot bejustified under the male captus bene detentus ("male
captus") doctrine.
1. The male captus doctrine is not customary.
While the male captus doctrine is supported by some State practice, ' 4'
there is also sufficient State practice to the contrary.4 2 Where the practices of
States are characterized with so much fluctuation, discrepancy and
contradiction, it is impossible to discern a uniform usage accepted as law,143
such as the flip-flopping decisions on the extent and validity of the male captus
doctrine. 144 Moreover, Opinio Juris is lacking in the application of the male
captus doctrine as it is applied merely in deference to the executive branch of
the Government.45 Accordingly, the male captus doctrine has not attained
customary status.
2. Assuming that the male captus doctrine is customary,
it is still not applicable.
Resort to the male captus principle ispermitted only in the absence of any
protest by the State whose territorial integrity has been violated In Ker v.
138. H.R. Comm., supra note 105.
139. DUFFY, supra note 61, at 293.
140. AI-Nashifv. Bulgaria, App.No. 50963/00 (unreported) 123 (2002), cited in DUFFY, supra note
61, at 393; H.R. Comm., supra note 93, at 21.
141. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 42; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 510 (1952); United States ex el Lujan
v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (1975); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
142. State v. Ebrahim, 21 I.L.M. 888; United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (1974); United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 939 F.2d 1341 (1990); Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, A.C. 1254
(1964); Bennett v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, 3 All E.R. 138 (1993).
143. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266.
144. See Prosecutor v, Nikolid, Case No.IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Concerning Legality of Arrest, 30 (2003).
145. Borelli, The Rendition ofTerrorist Suspects to the United States: Human Rights and the Limits
oflnternational Cooperation, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONALNORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 331,354 (Bianchi
ed., 2004).
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Illinois, '46 the defendant, who was facing charges of larceny, was kidnapped in
Peru by an American envoy. The US. Supreme Court held that where a refugee
is apprehended by kidnapping or other irregular means, the right to set up as
defense the unlawful manner by which he was brought to a court belongs "to
the Government from whose territory he was wrongfully taken. "47 This was
affirmed in Eichmann48 where the question on jurisdiction over Eichmann was
resolved by the waiver of Argentina of its claims, including the return of the
accused149 Only after such waiver did Israel proceed to exercise jurisdiction
to bring the accused to trial. 5 '
In this case, Applicant never waived its claim and had constantlyprotested
the violation of its territorial integrity. In fact, Applicant expressed its outrage
in the clearest possible terms during a press conference (C.32) and even sent
a diplomatic note to Respondent formally protesting the violation of its
territory, the kidnapping and mistreatment of its citizens, and demanding their
immediate repatriation (C. 36). Accordingly, Respondent must refrain from
exercising jurisdiction to prosecute Penza and the Others as Applicant is
protesting Respondent's illegal rendition of Penza and the other Adovans.
IV APPLICANT'S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER FORMER
PRESIDENT KIR GO VAND RETIRED GENERAL VINITSA TO
PROSECUTE THEM IN APPLICANT FOR CRIMES COMMTED
AGAINST PENZA AND THE OTHERS IS CONSISTENT WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. General Vinitsa and President Kirgov are personally liable for torture.
In his Proclamation (C.A.11I), then Colonel Vinitsa authorized interroga-
tion techniques which resulted in torture as shown in PartlI(B)(1) (a) (i). In turn,
President Vinitsa did nothing to stop the acts that subsequentlyfollowedfrom
such Proclamation despite the fact that he had control over the military as
President and commander-in-chief (C. 29). Therefore, retired General Vinitsa
is liable for ordering torturous acts,5 1 while both of them are liable for
violating the CAT 152 and for the acts of their subordinates through command
responsibility.'
146. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
147. Id.
148. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 147.
149. Id. at 50.
150. Id.
151. ICTY Statute, art.7(1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, art.6(1), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess, U.N. Doc.S/RES/955 (1994)[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
152. CAT, art.4.
153. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No.IT- 96-21-T, 386 (1998).
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B. Applicant is justified in prosecuting former President Kirgov and retired
General Vinitsa based on established international law principles on
jurisdiction.
1. Applicant has jurisdiction pursuant to the universality principle.
Under Customary InternationalLaw, universaljurisdiction' entitles each
and every State to have jurisdiction and try the offense. ' It is triggered by the
commission of crimes that are particularly offensive to the international
community as a whole such as torture.," As probable cause exists for the
charge oftorture,' Applicant is justifled in exercisingjurisdiction to prosecute
retired General Vinitsa and former President Kirgov.
2. Applicant has jurisdiction pursuant to the protective principle.
The protective principle justifies the exercise ofjurisdiction over persons
whose acts are directed against the vital interests of the State even though
committed abroad. 8 To illustrate, Israel exercised jurisdiction to prosecute
Eichmann because its "vital interests " were endangered by Eichmann's order
to kill Jewish citizens of Israel.159 In In Re Urios,160 French authorities
convicted a Spanish National of espionage while he was in Spain during the
First World War. Similarly, Applicant is fully justified in exercising jurisdic-
tion to prosecute retired General Vinitsa and former President Kirgov whose
"gross mistreatment of [Applicant's] nationals without due process or any
process of law offends all Adovans to their core " (C. 42), even if these acts were
committed outside Applicant's territory.
3. Applicant has jurisdiction pursuant to the passive personality principle.
A State may exercise criminal jurisdiction over a person for his acts that
are harmful to its nationals.'6' Applying this principle in U.S. v. Yunis, where
several American nationals were on the hijackedflight, the Court held that the
154. CAT, arts.4, 5, 9; R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte, 2 All E.R. 97 (1999).
155. SHAW, supra note 1,at 592.
156. Id. at 593.
157. See discussion supra Part 11(B).
158. Harvard Research, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 A.J.IL. SuPP.
480, 519 (1935); United States v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896 (1988).
159. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 277.
160. 1 A.D. 107 (1920).
161. CAT, art.5(l)(c); BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 40, at 81; Arrest Warrant of April 11, 2000
(Dem.Rep.Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,%16, 47.
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passive personality principle is an appropriate basis forjurisdiction. 162 Retired
General Vinitsa and former President Kirgov who ordered or tolerated the
kidnapping, torture and gross mistreatment ofAdovan citizens rightfully gives
Applicant jurisdiction to prosecute them.
C. The rules on immunity do not prohibit Applicant from exercising
jurisdiction.
1. Retired General Vinitsa and former President Kirgov are not State
Officials enjoying immunity ratione personae.
Customary International Law accords immunity ratione personae to
incumbent Ministers of Foreign Affairs to ensure the effective performance of
their function on behalf oftheir respective States.163 However, retired General
Vinitsa does not enjoy immunity ratione personae as he is not a Minister of
Foreign Affairs but is merely a member of the Advisory Council on
International Law to the Rotanian Foreign Ministry. (C. 38)
A sitting Head of State enjoys immunity ratione personae and is
completely immune from jurisdiction of national courts of other States.64
Kirgov already resigned from office and was succeeded by Pavel Bash as the
new President ofRotania (C. 39). Hence, former President Kirgov is no longer
entitled to immunity ratione personae.
2. Vinitsa and Kirgov are not entitled to immunity ratione materiae because
the acts complained of are not State functions.
Former Heads of State65 and military commanders166 are entitled
immunity ratione materiae only in relation their official acts done during the
term of their office. In contrast to immunity ratione personae which is
absolute, immunity ratione materiae is limited and covers only official acts. 67
Hence, immunity ratione materiae is not a bar to the prosecution of
international crimes before national courts. 68
In this case, former President Kirgov and retired General Vinitsa are
liable for acts of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. As held
in Pinochet, thejus cogens status of the prohibition against torture overrides
162. 681 F.Supp. 896, 902 (1988).
163. Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. at 54; DIXON & MCCORQUODALE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAw 318-319 (2003).
164. Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. at 24; Bow Street, 2 All E.R. at 97.
165. Bow Street, 2 All E.R. at 97; BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 575.
166. Bow Street, 2 All E.R. at 97.
167. Id.
168. Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be TriedForInternational Crimes? Some Comments
on The Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 E.J.I.L. 853, 870 (2002).
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immunity ratione materiae enjoyed by a former head of State for acts
performed in the course of official functions. '69 Similarly, immunity ratione
materiae is not a bar to the prosecution of crimes amounting to cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment because such acts are considered international
crimes.17 Accordingly, former President Kirgov and retired General Vinitsa
are not entitled to immunity ratione materiae for their criminal acts.
CONCL USION AND PRA YER FOR RELIEF
Applicant requests that the ICJ adjudge and declare that:
(a) The apprehension and rendition of Penza and the Others was
a violation of Applicant's sovereignty and International Law;
(b) The subsequent detention and treatment of Penza and the
Others violated International Law;
(c) Respondent's prosecution of the detained Adovan citizens
before the Rotanian Military Commission, including Penza's
prosecution for conspiracy, arson, and murder, violates
International Law; and
(d) Applicant's exercise of jurisdiction over former President
Kirgov and retired General Vinitsa to prosecute them in
Applicant for crimes committed against Penza and the Others
is consistent with International Law.
Respectfully submitted,
AGENTS OF APPLICANT
169. Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 528 (2002).
170. Prosecutor v. Blaskid, Case No.IT-95-14-T, at 41 (2000); Furunaiyja, Case No.IT-95-17/1 -T,
at 1140; CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 267 (2003).
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